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Abstract
Recently, C-LOG was introduced as a language for modelling
causal processes. Its formal semantics has been defined, but
the study of this language is far from finished. In this pa-
per, we compare C-LOG to other declarative modelling lan-
guages. More specifically, we compare to first-order logic
(FO), and argue that C-LOG and FO are orthogonal and that
their integration, FO(C), is a knowledge representation lan-
guage that allows for clear and succinct models. We compare
FO(C) to E-disjunctive logic programming with the stable
semantics, and define a fragment on which both semantics
coincide. Furthermore, we discuss object-creation in FO(C),
relating it to mathematics, business rules systems, and data
base systems.
1 Introduction
Previous work introduced C-LOG
(Bogaerts et al. 2014 in press), an expressive language
construct to describe causal processes, and FO(C), its
integration with classical logic. In that work, it is indicated
that C-LOG shows similarities to many other languages and
it is suggested that C-LOG could serve as a tool to study
the semantical relationship between these languages. In this
paper, we take the first steps for such a study: we discuss the
relationship of FO(C) with other paradigms and through
this discussion, provide a comprehensive overview of the
informal semantics of FO(C).
C-LOG and FO are syntactically very similar, but seman-
tically very different languages. In this paper we formalise
the semantical relationship between C-LOG and FO, and
argue how their integration, FO(C), is a rich language in
which knowledge can be represented succinctly and clearly.
We explain how modelling in FO(C) relates to the “gen-
erate, define, and test” methodology used in answer set
programming. We discuss how FO(C) relates to disjunc-
tive logic programs with existential quantification in rule
heads (You, Zhang, and Zhang 2013), both informally and
formally, and we identify a subset of E-disjunctive logic pro-
grams on which stable semantics corresponds to the FO(C)
semantics. We also discuss four important knowledge rep-
resentation constructs that FO(C) adds with respect to E-
disjunctive logic programs: nested rules (in fact, arbitrary
nesting of expressions), dynamic choice, object creation,
and a more modular semantics.
Furthermore, we discuss object-creation in related
paradigms. One of those discussed paradigms is the
field of deductive databases, where extensions of Data-
log have been defined. In (Abiteboul and Vianu 1991),
rules with existentially quantified head variables are used
for object creation. It is remarkable to see how the
same extension of logic programs is used sometimes
(e.g., in (You, Zhang, and Zhang 2013)) for selection, and
sometimes (e.g., in (Abiteboul and Vianu 1991)) for object-
creation. Consider for example a rule
∀X : ∃Y : P (X,Y ) :- q(X).
Viewing this rule as a rule in an E-disjunctive logic program,
it corresponds to the C-LOG expression
AllX [q(X)] : SelectY [t] : P (X,Y ),
where for every X satisfying q, one existing value
Y is selected, and P (X,Y ) is caused. The selected
Y can be different or equal for different X’s. On
the other hand, in case this same rule occurs in a
LogicBlox (Green, Aref, and Karvounarakis 2012) specifi-
cation, it corresponds to the C-LOG expression
AllX [q(X)] : New Y : P (X,Y ),
where for every X satisfying q a new value Y is invented.
Thus implying among others that all of these values are
different. The explicit distinction C-LOG makes between
object-creation and selection is necessary for studying the
relationship between these languages.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section
2 we give preliminaries, including the syntax and informal
semantics of C-LOG. In Sections 3 and 4, we focus on the
creation-free fragment of C-LOG, i.e., on expressions with-
out the New-operator: first, we compare C-LOG to FO and
discuss the integration of these two; afterwards, we compare
C-LOG to E-disjunctive logic programs. In Section 5, we
discuss object-creation in C-LOG by providing simple intu-
itive examples and relating the New-operator to other lan-
guages with similar forms of object-creation. We conclude
in Section 6.
2 C-LOG
We assume familiarity with the basics of first-order logic.
Vocabularies, formulas, and terms are defined as usual. We
use t for truth and f for falsity. σI denotes the interpretation
of symbol σ in structure I. Domain atoms are atoms of the
form P (d) where the di are domain elements. We use re-
stricted quantifications (Preyer and Peter 2002), e.g., in FO,
these are formulas of the form ∀x[ψ] : ϕ or ∃x[ψ] : ϕ, mean-
ing that ϕ holds for all (resp. for a) x such that ψ holds. The
above expressions are syntactic sugar for ∀x : ψ ⇒ ϕ and
∃x : ψ ∧ ϕ, but such a reduction is not possible for other
restricted quantifiers in C-LOG. We call ψ the qualification
and ϕ the assertion of the restricted quantifications. From
now on, let Σ be a relational vocabulary, i.e., Σ consists only
of predicate, constant and variable symbols.
In what follows we briefly repeat the syntax and infor-
mal semantics of C-LOG. For more details and an exten-
sive overview of the formal semantics of C-LOG, we refer
to (Bogaerts et al. 2014 in press).
2.1 Syntax of C-LOG
Definition 2.1. Causal effect expressions (CEE) are defined
inductively as follows:
• if P (t) is an atom, then P (t) is a CEE,
• if ϕ is an FO formula and C′ is a CEE, then C′ ← ϕ is a
CEE,
• if C1 and C2 are CEEs, then C1AndC2 is a CEE,
• if C1 and C2 are CEEs, then C1OrC2 is a CEE,
• if x is a variable, ϕ is a first-order formula and C′ is a
CEE, then Allx[ϕ] : C′ is a CEE,
• if x is a variable, ϕ is a first-order formula and C′ is a
CEE, then Selectx[ϕ] : C′ is a CEE,
• if x is a variable and C′ is a CEE, then New x : C′ is a
CEE.
We call a CEE an atom-expression (respectively rule-,
And-, Or-, All-, Select- or New-expression) if it is of
the corresponding form. We use Allx[ϕ] : C as an ab-
breviation for Allx1[t] : . . .Allxn[ϕ] : C and similar for
Select-expressions. We call a predicate symbol P endoge-
nous in C if P occurs as the symbol of a (possibly nested)
atom-expression in C, i.e., if P occurs in C but not only in
first-order formulas. All other symbols are called exogenous
in C. An occurrence of a variable x is bound in a CEE if
it occurs in the scope of a quantification over that variable
(∀x, ∃x, Allx, Selectx, or Newx) and free otherwise. A
variable is free in a CEE if it has free occurrences. A causal
theory, or C-LOG theory is a CEE without free variables.
We often represent a causal theory as a set of CEEs; the in-
tended causal theory is the And-conjunction of these CEEs.
2.2 Informal Semantics of C-LOG
In this section, we discuss the informal semantics of CEEs.
We repeat the driving principles on a simple example—one
without non-determinism—and discuss more complex ex-
pressions afterwards.
Driving Principles Following the philosophy of
(Vennekens, Denecker, and Bruynooghe 2009), the se-
mantics of C-LOG is based on two principles that
are common in causal modelling. The first is the
distinction between endogenous and exogenous prop-
erties, i.e., those whose value is determined by the
causal laws in the model and those whose value is not,
respectively (Pearl 2000). The second is the default-
deviant assumption, used also by, e.g., (Hall 2004;
Hitchcock 2007). The idea here is to assume that each
endogenous property of the domain has some “natural”
state, that it will be in whenever nothing is acting upon
it. For ease of notation, C-LOG identifies the default state
with falsity, and the deviant state with truth. For example,
consider the following simplified model of a bicycle, in
which a pair of gear wheels can be put in motion by
pedalling:
Turn(BigGear)← Pedal. (1)
Turn(BigGear)← Turn(SmallGear). (2)
Turn(SmallGear)← Turn(BigGear). (3)
Here, Pedal is exogenous, while Turn(BigGear) and
Turn(SmallGear) are endogenous. The semantics of this
causal model is given by a straightforward “execution” of
the rules. The domain starts out in an initial state, in which
all endogenous atoms have their default value false and the
exogenous atom Pedal has some fixed value. If Pedal
is true, then the first rule is applicable and may be fired
(“Pedal causes Turn(BigGear)”) to produce a new state
of the domain in which Turn(BigGear) now has its de-
viant value true. In this way, we construct the following
sequence of states (we abbreviate symbols by their first let-
ter):
{P} → {P, T (B)} → {P, T (B), T (S)} (4)
In general, given a causal theory ∆, a causal process is a
(possibly transfinite) sequence of intermediate states, start-
ing from the default state such that, at each state, the effects
described by ∆ take place. This notion of causal process is
based on the following principles:
• The principle of sufficient causation states that if the pre-
condition to a causal law is satisfied, then the event that it
triggers must eventually happen. For example, the process
described in (4) cannot stop after the first step: there is a
cause for Turn(SmallGear), hence this should eventu-
ally happen.
• The principle of universal causation states that all
changes to the state of the domain must be triggered by
a causal law whose precondition is satisfied. For exam-
ple, the small gear can only turn if the big gear turns.
• The principle of no self-causation states that nothing can
happen based on itself. E.g., if rule (1) would be excluded
from the causal theory, the gears cannot start rotating by
themselves.
Complex Expressions A (possibly infinite) structure is a
model of a causal theory ∆ if it is the final state of a (non-
deterministic) causal processes described by ∆. In order to
define these processes correctly, one should know the events
that take place in every state. We call the set of those events
the effect set of the causal theory. There are two kinds of
effects that can be described by a causal theory: 1) flipping
an atom from its default to its deviant state and 2) creating
a new domain element. We now explain in a compositional
way what the effect set of a causal theory is in a given state
of affairs, which we represent as usual by a structure.
The effect of an atom-expression A is that A is flipped
to its deviant state. A conditional effect, i.e., a rule expres-
sion, causes the effect set of its head if its body is satisfied in
the current state, and nothing otherwise. The effect set de-
scribed by an And-expression is the union of the effect sets
of its two subexpressions; an All-expression Allx[ϕ] : C′
causes the union of all effect sets of C′(x) for those x’s that
satisfy ϕ. An expression C1OrC2 non-deterministically
causes either the effect set of C1 or the effect set of C2; a
Select-expression Selectx[ϕ] : C′ causes the effect set of
C′ for a non-deterministically chosen x that satisfies ϕ. An
object-creating CEE Newx : C′ causes the creation of a
new domain element n and the effect set of C′(n).
Informally, CEEs only cause changes to the state once
(for each of its instantiations), e.g., a Select-expression
Selectx[ϕ] : C′ causes the effect set of C′ for a non-
deterministically chosen x once, and cannot cause C′ for
another x afterwards.
Example 2.2. Permanent residence in the United States can
be obtained in several ways. One way is passing the natural-
isation test. Another way is by playing the “Green Card Lot-
tery”, where each year a number of lucky winners are ran-
domly selected and granted permanent residence. We model
this as follows:{
All p[Apply(p) ∧ PassedTest(p)] : PermRes(p)
(Select p[Play(p)] : PermRes(p))← Lottery.
}
The first CEE describes the “normal” way to obtain per-
manent residence; the second rule expresses that one win-
ner is selected among everyone who plays the lottery. If
I is a structure in which Lottery holds, due to the non-
determinism, there are many possible effect sets of the above
CEE, namely the sets {PermRes(p) | p ∈ ApplyI ∧ p ∈
PassedTestI} ∪ {PermRes(d)} for some d ∈ PlayI .
Models of this causal theory are structures such that ev-
eryone who applies and passes the test has permanent resi-
dence, and in case the lottery happens, one random person
who played the lottery as well, and such that furthermore
no-one else obtains permanent residence. The principle of
sufficient causation guarantees a form of closed world as-
sumption: you can only obtain residence if there is a rule
that causes you to obtain this nationality. The two CEEs are
considered independent: the winner could be one of the peo-
ple that obtained it through standard application, as well as
someone else, i.e., the semantics allows both minimal and
non-minimal models.
Note that in the above, there is a great asymmetry be-
tween Play(p), which occurs as a qualification of Select-
expression, and PermRes(p), which occurs as a caused
atom. This means that the effect will never cause atoms of
the formPlay(p), but only atoms of the formPermRes(p).
This is one of the cases where the qualification of an expres-
sion cannot simply be eliminated.
Example 2.3. Hitting the “send” button in your mail ap-
plication causes the creation of a new package containing a
specific mail. That package is put on a channel and will be
received some (unknown) time later. As long as the package
is not received, it stays on the channel. In C-LOG, we model
this as follows:

Allm, t[Mail(m) ∧HitSend(m, t)] : New p :
Pack(p)AndCont(p,m)AndOnCh(p, t+ 1)And
Selectd[d > 0] : Received(p, t+ d)
All p, t[Pack(p) ∧OnCh(p, t) ∧ ¬Received(p, t)] :
OnCh(p, t+ 1)


Suppose an interpretation HitSendI = {(MyMail, 0)} is
given. A causal process then unfolds as follows: it starts in
the initial state, where all endogenous predicates are false.
The effect set of the above causal effect in that state con-
sists of 1) the creation of one new domain element, say
p, and 2) the caused atoms Pack( p), Cont( p,MyMail),
OnCh( p, 1) and Received( p, 7), where instead of 7, we
could have chosen any number greater than zero. Next, it
continues, and in every step t, before receiving the pack-
age, an extra atom OnCh(p, t+1) is caused. Finally, in the
seventh step, no more atoms are caused; the causal process
ends. The final state is a model of the causal theory.
2.3 FO(C)
First-order logic and C-LOG have a straightforward integra-
tion, FO(C). Theories in this logic are sets of FO sentences
and causal theories. A model of such a theory is a structure
that is a model of each of its expressions (of each of its CEEs
and sentences). An illustration is the mail protocol from Ex-
ample 2.3, which we can extend with the “observation” that
at some time, two packages are on the channel:
∃t, p1, p2[p1 6= p2] : OnCh(p1, t) ∧OnCh(p2, t).
Models of this theory represent states of affairs where at
least once two packages are on the channel simultaneously.
This entirely differs from And-conjoining our CEE with
Select t, p1, p2[p1 6= p2] : OnCh(p1, t)AndOnCh(p2, t).
The resulting CEE would have unintended models in which
two packages suddenly appear on the channel for no reason.
Note that in the definitions of C-LOG, we restricted atten-
tion to relational vocabularies. All the theory can straight-
forwardly be generalised as long as function symbols do not
occur as endogenous symbols in CEEs, i.e., if they only oc-
cur in FO sentences or as exogenous symbols in causal the-
ories.
3 C-LOG, FO, and FO(C)
There is an obvious syntactical correspondence between
FO and creation-free C-LOG (C-LOG without New-
expressions): And corresponds to ∧, Or to ∨, ← to ⇐,
All to ∀, and Select to ∃. As already mentioned above,
expressions in C-LOG have an entirely different meaning
than the corresponding FO expression. A C-LOG expres-
sion describes a process in which more and more facts are
caused, while an FO expression describes a truth. For exam-
ple P OrQ describes a process that picks either P or Q
and makes one of them true, hence its models are structures
in which exactly one of the two holds. On the other hand,
the FO sentence P ∨ Q has more models, namely also one
in which both hold. We generalise this observation:
Theorem 3.1. Let ∆ be a creation-free causal theory over
Σ and T∆ the corresponding FO theory (the theory obtained
from ∆ by replacing All by ∀, Select by ∃, Or by ∨, And
by∧, and← by⇐). Then for every Σ-structure I, if I |= ∆,
then also I |= T∆.
The reverse often does not hold: there is no obvious way
to translate any FO formula to a C-LOG expression. In some
cases, it is possible to find an inverse transformation, for ex-
ample for positive (negation-free) FO theories. This would
yield a constructive way to create models for a positive FO
theory, which is not a surprising, nor a very interesting re-
sult; another constructive way to get a model of such a the-
ory would be to make everything true. But it is interesting
to view C-LOG theories as a constructive way to create a
certain structure. This shows that modelling in C-LOG
is orthogonal to modelling in FO. In FO, by default every-
thing is open, every atom can be true or false arbitrarily.
Every constraint removes worlds from the set of possible
worlds. In C-LOG on the other hand, all endogenous sym-
bols are by default false. Adding extra rules to a C-LOG
theory can result in more models (when introducing extra
non-determinism), or modify worlds. In some cases, one of
the approaches is more natural than the other.
Consider for example a steel oven scheduling problem.
For every block of steel, we should find a time t to put that
block in the oven and at time t+D, where D is some fixed
delay, we take the block out. In C-LOG this is modelled as
All b[Block(b)] : Select t[t] : In(b, t)AndOut(b, t+D),
but to model this in FO we would get one similar constraint
together with several constraints guaranteeing uniqueness:
∀b[Block(b)] : ∃t : In(b, t) ∧Out(b, t+D)
∀b, t, t′[Block(b)] : In(b, t) ∧ In(b, t′)⇒ t = t′
∀b, t, t′[Block(b)] : Out(b, t) ∧Out(b, t′)⇒ t = t′
∀x : (∃t : In(x, t) ∨Out(x, t))⇒ Block(x)
Here, the approach in C-LOG is much more natural, as in
this example it is clear how to construct a model, whereas
to model it in FO, we should analyse all properties of mod-
els. On the other hand, if we extend this example with a
constraint that no two blocks can enter the oven at the same
time, this is easily expressible in FO:
¬∃t, b, b′[b 6= b′] : In(b, t) ∧ In(b′, t),
while this is not naturally expressible in C-LOG. This shows
the power of FO(C), the integration of FO and C-LOG.
For example, the entire above scheduling problem would be
modelled in FO(C) as follows (where we use “{” and “}” to
separate the C-LOG theory from the FO sentences).{
All b[Block(b)] : Select t[t] :
In(b, t)AndOut(b, t+D)
}
¬∃t, b, b′[b 6= b′] : In(b, t) ∧ In(b′, t)
This is much more readable and much more concise than
any pure C-LOG or FO expression that expresses the same
knowledge. As can be seen, the integration of the orthogo-
nal languages FO and C-LOG, FO(C) provides a great mod-
elling flexibility.
4 FO(C) and ASP
.
The methodology from the previous section is very sim-
ilar to the “generate, define, and test” (GDT) methodology
used in Answer Set Programming (ASP). In that method-
ology, “generate” and “define” are constructive modules of
ASP programs that describe which atoms can be true, while
the “test” module corresponds to first-order sentences that
constrain solutions. In (Denecker et al. 2012), it has been
argued that GDT programs correspond to FO(ID) theories.
Furthermore, in (Bogaerts et al. 2014 in press), we showed
that FO(ID) is syntactically and semantically a sublan-
guage of FO(C). Here, we argue that a more general class
of ASP programs can be seen as FO(C) theories.
E-disjunctive programs (You, Zhang, and Zhang 2013)
are finite sets of rules of the form:
∀x : ∃y : α1; . . . ;αm :- β1, . . . , βk, not γ1, . . . , not γn. (5)
where the αi, βi and γi are atoms and variables in y only
occur in the αi. Given a structure M, we define M− as the
literal set
{¬α | α is a domain atom on dom(M) and M 6|= α}.
A structureM is a stable model of E-disjunctive programP
(denoted M |= P) if M is a minimal set X satisfying the
condition: for any rule r ∈ P and any variable assignment
η, if the literal set X ∪M− logically entails body(r)η, then
for some assignment θ, and for some α in the head of r,
(αη|x)θ ∈ X . A rule of the form (5) is called a constraint if
m = 0.
Definition 4.1. Let P be an E-disjunctive program. The cor-
responding FO(C)-theory is the theory TP with as C-LOG
expression the And-conjunction of all expressions
Allx[β1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬γn] : Select y[t] : α1Or . . . Orαm
such that there is a rule of the form (5) with m > 0 in P . TP
has as FO part:
• all sentences ∀x : ¬(β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βk ∧ ¬γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬γn)
such that there is a rule of the form (5) with m = 0 (i.e.,
a constraint) in P and
• the sentences ∀x : ¬P (x) for symbols P that do not occur
in the head of any rule in P .
The last type of constraint is a technical detail: in ASP, all
symbols are endogenous, while in C-LOG, this is only the
case for predicates occurring in “the head of rules”.
The above syntactical correspondence does not always
correspond to a semantical correspondence. Intuitively, an
E-disjunctive rule r (roughly) means the following: if the
body of r holds for an instantiation of x, then we select one
instantiation of the y and one disjunct; that disjunct is caused
to be true for that instantiation. But, globally the selection
should happen in such a way that the final model is minimal.
For example the program {p. p; q.} only has one stable
model, namely {p}. The intuition behind it is that the first
rule causes p to be true, and hence compromises the choice
in the second rule. As p already holds, the global minimality
condition ensures that the second rule is obliged to choose
p as well, if possible. When we slightly modify the above
program, by adding a constraint: {p. p; q. :- not q.} sud-
denly, q can (and should) be chosen by the second rule, as
{p} no longer is a model of this theory. The above illustrates
that there is a great interdependency between different rules
and between rules and constraints: adding an extra rule or
constraint changes the meaning of other rules. Below, we
identify a fragment of E-disjunctive ASP in which this de-
pendency is not too strong, and we show that for this frag-
ment, the stable model semantics equals the FO(C) seman-
tics. In order to do so, we introduce the following concepts:
Definition 4.2. Let δ be a domain atom and r a rule in the
form of (5). Suppose η is a variable assignment of the vari-
ables x and y. We say that δ occurs in r at i for η if αiη = δ.
We say that δ occurs in r if there exist and i and an η such
that r occurs at i for η.
Definition 4.3. We call a rule disjunctive if y is not the
empty tuple or if m > 1.
Definition 4.4. An E-disjunctive program P is called non-
overlapping if for every domain atom δ one of the following
holds
• δ occurs only in non-disjunctive rules, or
• there are at most one rule r, one i, and one η such that δ
occurs in r at i for η.
The above condition states that domain atoms occurring
in heads of disjunctive rules, cannot occur multiple times in
rule heads. Intuitively, this guarantees that different choices
do not interfere.
Theorem 4.5. Let P be a non-overlapping E-disjunctive
program without recursion over negation and TP the cor-
responding FO(C) theory. For every structure I, I |= P if
and only if I |= TP .
In Theorem 4.5, there is one extra condition on non-
overlapping ASP programs to be equivalent to the corre-
sponding FO(C) theory, namely that it does not contain re-
cursion over negation, i.e., there are no rules of the form
p :- not p′. p′ :- not p.
It has already been argued in (Denecker et al. 2012) that in
practical applications recursion over negation is mostly for
two purposes: 1) expressing constraints and 2) to “open” the
predicate p, i.e., to encode that it can have arbitrary truth
value. In this case, the predicate p′ would not be used in
the rest of the theory. This can as well be done with a rule
p; p′. This last rule is equivalent to the above two in non-
overlapping programs (or, if p and p′ do not occur in other
rule heads). In FO(C), we could either add the disjunctive
rule, or simply omit this rule, since exogenous predicates are
open anyway.
As already stated above, in case an ASP program is not
non-overlapping, semantics might differ. However, we do
have
Theorem 4.6. Let P be any E-disjunctive program with-
out recursion over negation and TP be the corresponding
FO(C) theory. For every structure I, if I |= P then also
I |= TP .
The reverse does not hold, since C-LOG does not impose
a global minimality condition. The difference in semantics
is illustrated in the American Lottery example, which we
resume below.
In the above, we argued that for many practical applica-
tions of E-disjunctive programs, semantics of FO(C) corre-
sponds to the stable model semantics. This raises the ques-
tion of relevance of FO(C). From a knowledge repre-
sentation perspective, FO(C) adds several useful constructs
with respect to E-disjunctive logic programs. Among these
are nested rules (in fact, arbitrary nesting of expressions),
dynamic choice, object creation, and a more modular seman-
tics.
Nested causal rules occur in many places, for example,
one could state that the electrician causes a causal link be-
tween a button and a light, e.g.,
(light← button)← electrician.
We found similar nested rules in
(Kowalski and Sadri 2013). Of course, for simple ex-
amples this can also be expressed compactly in ASP, e.g.
by
light :-electrician, button.
but when causes and effects are more complex, translating
them requires the introduction of auxiliary predicates, di-
minishing the readability of the resulting program.
Dynamic choices occur in many practical applications.
Consider the following situation: a robot enters a room,
opens some of the doors in this room, and then leaves by
one of the doors that are open. The robot’s leaving corre-
sponds to a non-deterministic choice between a dynamic set
of alternatives, which is determined by the robot’s own ac-
tions, and therefore cannot be hard-coded into the head of a
rule. In C-LOG, we would model this last choice as
Selectx[open(x)] : leave(x).
To model this in an E-disjunctive logic program, we need
an extra auxiliary predicate, thus reducing readability:
∃X : chosen(X).
∀X : leave(X) :- chosen(X).
∀X :- chosen(X); not open(X).
Modularity of the semantics has already been discussed
above: The non-overlapping condition on ASP programs
guarantees similar modularity. However, when the non-
overlapping condition is violated, semantics of ASP pro-
grams are often less clear. Let us reconsider Example 2.2.
The E-disjunctive program
∃X : permres(X) :- lottery.
∀X : permres(X) :- passtest(X).
is similar to{
(Selectx[t] : permres(x)) ← lottery
Allx[passtest(x)] : permres(x)
}
Semantically, the first imposes a minimality condition: the
lottery is always won by a person succeeding the test, if there
exists one. On the other hand, in C-LOG the two rules are in-
dependent, and models might not be minimal. In this exam-
ple, it is the latter that is intended. This illustrates modularity
of C-LOG. The rule (Selectx[t] : permres(x)) ← lottery
means that one person is selected randomly to obtain resi-
dence. Adding other rules does not change the meaning of
this rule; causal effects do not interfere.
Object-creation in C-LOG is discussed in the next section.
5 Object-creation in C-LOG
Object creation is available in C-LOG through the New-
operator. Like every language construct in C-LOG, the in-
formal interpretation of an expression
New x : P (x)← ϕ
is defined in terms of causal processes. The above expres-
sion states that ϕ causes the creation of a new element and
that for that new element, P is caused. Object-creation is
also subject to the principles of sufficient causation, uni-
versal causation and no self-causation. In order to apply
these principles, the domain of a structure is partitioned into
two parts: the initial elements are those whose existence is
not governed by the causal theory, they are exogenous and
the created elements are those created by expressions in the
causal theory, i.e., they are endogenous. For created ele-
ments, their default value is not existing and their deviant
value is existing. Thus, at the start of a causal process, only
the initial elements exist, as soon as the preconditions of a
New-expressions are satisfied, an element is added to the
domain. The principle of no self-causation takes these de-
fault and deviant values into account: an object cannot be
created based on its own existence. Consider for example
the following causal theory:
Selectx[t] : P (x)
(New y : Q(y))← ∃x : P (x)
Selectx[t] : R(x)
The first and last expressions select one object randomly and
cause P (respectively R) to hold for that object. The sec-
ond expression creates a new element conditionally, only if
there is at least one element satisfying P . In this example,
the element selected for the first expression cannot be the
one created in the second. Select-operators can only select
existing elements and the object created in the second ex-
pression can only be created after the selection in the first
rule, after there is some object satisfying P . For the last ex-
pression, any element can be selected. Hence, this causal
theory has no models with only one domain element. A
structure I with domain {A,B} and with P I = {A} and
QI = RI = {B} is a model of the above causal theory.
In this case, B is the unique created element, and A is ini-
tial, i.e., A is assumed to exist before the described causal
process takes place. This illustrates that the New-operator
is more than simply a Select together with unique name
axioms: its semantics is really integrated in the underly-
ing causal process. The behaviour of New-expressions can
be simulated using Select-expressions if we make the two
parts of the domain (initial and created elements) explicit
and conditionalise all quantifications. A detailed discussion
of this transformation is out of the scope of this paper.
Object creation occurs in many fields, of which we dis-
cuss some below.
5.1 Object-Creation in Database Systems
Object-creation has been studied intensively in the field of
deductive databases. In (Abiteboul and Vianu 1991), vari-
ous extensions of Datalog, are considered, resulting in non-
deterministic semantics for queries and updates. One of
the studied extensions is object creation (throught existential
quantifications in rule heads). These and similar related ex-
tension have been implemented in several systems, includ-
ing LogicBlox (Green, Aref, and Karvounarakis 2012). An
example from the latter paper is the rule:
President(p), presidentOf [c] = p← Country(c).
which means that for every country c, a new (anonymous)
“derived entity” of type President is created. Of course,
the president of a country is not a new person, but the presi-
dent is new with respect to the database, which does not con-
tain any persons yet. Such rules with (implicit) existentially
quantified head variables correspond to New-expressions.
Here, it would translate to
All c[Country(c)] : New p : Pres(p)And presOf(c, p).
This shows that in some rule-based paradigms, an ex-
istentially quantified head-variable corresponds to object-
creation (New), while in other rule-based paradigms, such
as ASP, we saw that an existentially quantified head vari-
able corresponds to a selection. The relation between these
paradigms has, to the best of our knowledge, not yet been
studied thoroughly. We believe that FO(C), which makes an
explicit distinction between selection and object-creation, is
an interesting tool to study this relationship. This is future
work.
Many other Datalog extensions with forms
of object creation exist. For example
(Van den Bussche and Paredaens 1995) discusses a version
with creation of sets and compares its expressivity with
simple object creation.
Object-creation also occurs in other database languages,
such as for example the query language whilenew in
(Abiteboul, Hull, and Vianu 1995). An expression
while R do (P = new Q)
in that language corresponds to a CEE.
All t[R(t)] : Allx[t] : New y : P (x, y, t+ 1)← Q(x, t).
In fact in (Bogaerts et al. 2014 submitted), it has been shown
that C-LOG can “simulate” the entire language whilenew.
5.2 Object-Creation in Mathematics
Object-creation also occurs in mathematics. The set of all
natural numbers can be thought of as the set obtained by a
process that first creates one element (zero) and for every
element in this set, adds another element (its successor). In
C-LOG, the above natural language sentences can be mod-
elled as follows
Newx : (Nat(x)AndZero(x))
Allx[Nat(x)] : New y : (Nat(y)AndSucc(x, y)).
Models of the above theory are exactly those structures in-
terpretingNat, Zero, Succ as the natural numbers, zero and
the successor function (modulo isomorphism).
5.3 Object-Creation in Business Rules Systems
Business Rules (Business Rules Group 2000) engines are
widely used in the industry. One big drawback of these sys-
tems is their inability to perform multiple forms of reason-
ing. For example, banks might use a Business Rules en-
gine to decide whether someone is eligible for a loan. This
approach can be very efficient, but as soon as one is not
only interested in the above question, but also in explana-
tions, or suggestions about what to change in order to be-
come eligible, the application should be redesigned. Pre-
vious attempts to translate Business Rules applications into
a logic with a Tarskian model semantics have been made
in (Hertum et al. 2013). The conclusion of this study was
that for such a transformation, we need object creation .
We believe that C-LOG provides a suitable form of object-
creation for this purpose. As an illustration, the JBoss man-
ual (Browne 2009) contains the following rule:
when Order( customer == null )
then insertLogical(new
ValidationResult(
validation.customer.missing ));
This rule means that if an order is created without customer,
a new ValidationResult is created with the message that the
customer is missing. This can be translated to C-LOG as
follows:
All y[Order(y) ∧NoCustumer(y)] :
Newx : V alidationR(x)AndMessage(x, “. . . ”).
A more thorough study of the relationship between the oper-
ational semantics of Business Rules systems and the seman-
tics of C-LOG is a topic for future work.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we compared FO(C) to other modelling
paradigms. We discussed the semantical relationship be-
tween C-LOG and FO. We identified a fragment of E-
disjunctive logic programs for which the stable model se-
mantics corresponds to the semantics of FO(C), and ar-
gued how FO(C) enriches such programs with several use-
ful modelling constructs. Furthermore, we argued that the
object-creation in FO(C) corresponds to the object creation
in many related language. Besides technical relationship be-
tween these languages, we believe that this discussion also
provides insights in the semantics of FO(C).
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